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Revenue Code Section 482 Under the Legal
Disability Doctrine
I. Introduction
Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code' was enacted by Con-
gress to place controlled taxpayers on a "tax parity" with uncon-
trolled taxpayers. 2 Such "tax parity" can not be achieved where
related business enterprises are able to avoid imposition of United
States Federal Income Tax by arbitrarily shifting income, expenses,
or other deductions between controlling entities and their controlled
affiliates. Therefore, section 482 allows the Commissioner of the In-
ternal Revenue Service to allocate items of income or expenses
among related businesses so that tax records will reflect true taxable
income.3
1 26 U.S.C. § 482 (1988). The history of section 482 began with section 240 of the
Revenue Act of 1918 requiring that affiliated corporations file consolidated returns. Reve-
nue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 240(a), 40 Stat. 1057, 1081 (1919). In 1921, section 240 of the
Revenue Act of 1921 was provided "to prevent the arbitrary shifting of profits among
related businesses." S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1921). Section 45 of the
Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 45, 45 Stat. 806, was enacted to "prevent tax evasion by
the shifting of profits, the making of fictitious sales, and other methods frequently adopted
for the purpose of'milking'." H.R. REP. No. 2, 70th Cong., ist Sess. 16-17 (1928). Sec-
tion 482 has undergone little change since the Revenue Act of 1928, although Congress
did amend section 482 in 1986 to provide that the income from a transfer of an interest in
intangible property shall be "commensurate with the income attributable to the intangi-
ble." 26 U.S.C. § 482.
2 Treas. Reg. 1.482-1 (b) (as amended in 1986). Commissioner v. First Security Bank
of Utah, 405 U.S. 394, 400 (1972); SimonJ. Murphy Co. v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 639,
644 (6th Cir. 1956); Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 525, 581 (1989), aff'd
933 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir. 1991). The distinction between "controlled" and "uncontrolled"
taxpayers refers to the corporate structure in which business entities operate. Section 482
ensures equal tax treatment of business enterprises regardless of their autonomy or mem-
bership in a family of affiliated companies. In the absence of section 482, controlling cor-
porations could structure transactions with their affiliates to achieve favorable tax
treatment otherwise unavailable if the controlling corporations had dealt with unrelated
third parties. See infra notes i1-19 and accompanying text.
3 When tax records of controlled taxpayers do not accurately reflect true taxable
income, the regulations of section 482 allow the district director to make "such distribu-
tions, apportionments, or allocations as he may deem necessary of gross income, deduc-
tions, credits, or allowances, or of any item or element affecting taxable income . . . [to]
determine the true taxable income of [such] controlled taxpayer." Treas. Reg. 1.482-
1(b)(1).
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
The Commissioner's power to allocate items of income and de-
ductions under section 482 is particularly important in the taxation
of international business transactions where a United States taxpayer
controls or is controlled by a foreign affiliate. 4 Recently, however,
the Treasury's ability to maintain "tax parity" under section 482 has
been severely limited by the Tax Court's decision in Procter & Gamble
Co. v. Commissioner.5 In Procter & Gamble, a Spanish subsidiary corpo-
ration was controlled by a wholly owned Swiss subsidiary of Procter
& Gamble Co. (P&G), a United States corporate taxpayer. 6 Under
Spanish law, the Spanish corporation was prohibited from making
any royalty payments to the Swiss subsidiary for use of the P&G Co.'s
intangible property.7 Because the Spanish government's prohibition
on royalty payments caused the shifting of income from the U.S. par-
ent to the Spanish subsidiary, the Commissioner of the Internal Rev-
enue Service determined that a section 482 adjustment was required
to clearly reflect the income of the parent.8 The Tax Court held,
however, that because Spanish law prohibited the Spanish subsidiary
from making royalty payments, no section 482 allocation was
warranted. 9
II. An Overview of Section 482
The Commissioner's authority to allocate items of income
among related businesses is governed by section 482 of the Internal
Revenue Code. Section 482 states:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses
(whether or not incorporated, whether or not organized in the
United States, and whether or not affiliated) owned or controlled
directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary may dis-
tribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or
allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or busi-
nesses, if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or
allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly
to reflect the income of any of such organizations, trades, or
businesses.
In the case of any transfer (or license) of intangible property... the
income with respect to such transfer or license shall be commensu-
rate with the income attributable to the intangible.' 0
The regulations of section 482 broadly define the terms "controlled
4 See Comment, First Security Bank of Utah-Its Effect Upon The Expanded Scope of Section
482, 61 Ky. L.J. 845 (1973) [hereinafter The Expanded Scope of Section 482] (stating that the
Commissioner's use of section 482 is "most notorious" in the "international business
scene").
5 95 T.C. 323 (1990).
6 Id. at 324.
7 Id. at 324-26.
8 Id. at 330-31.
9 Id. at 337-38.
10 26 U.S.C. § 482 (1988).
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taxpayer""II and "true taxable income"' 2 to ensure that the taxable
income of the controlling taxpayer is commensurate with the taxable
income that would have been reported had the controlling taxpayer
dealt at arm's length with an uncontrolled entity.'t Detailed regula-
tions are provided to guide tax reporting where one member of a
controlled group: 1) performs services for another member, 14
2) transfers intangible property,' 5 or 3) makes sales of tangible
property to an affiliate.' 6
A simple illustration will-demonstrate the potential for tax
avoidance that would exist were the Treasury not armed with the
authority to reallocate items of income via section 482. Suppose that
Corp-America, organized and domiciled in the United States, oper-
ates a wholly owned subsidiary, Sub-Italia, in Italy. Sub-Italia was or-
ganized by Corp-America as a European distributor of products
manufactured by Corp-America in the United States. Assuming that
Corp-America is subject to a higher U.S. corporate tax rate than Italy
imposes upon Sub-Italia, Corp-America would desire to set, as low
II "The term 'controlled' includes any kind of control, direct or indirect, whether
legally enforceable, and however exercisable or exercised." Treas. Reg. 1.482-1(a)(3).
The regulations further state that "[a] presumption of control arises if income or deduc-
tions have been arbitrarily shifted." Id. Unlike other Code sections that define "control,"
the definition of "control" provided in the regulations to section 482 is broad and contains
no cross reference to other sections of the Code. The Expanded Scope of Section 482, supra
note 4, at 854.
12 The regulations define "true taxable income" as "the taxable income (or... any
item or element affecting taxable income) which would have resulted to the controlled
taxpayer, had it... dealt with the other member.., of the group at arm's length." Treas.
Reg. 1.482-1 (a)(6).
13 Treas. Reg. 1.482-1(b)(1). See Baldwin Bros. v. Commissioner, 361 F.2d 668, 670
(3d Cir. 1966); Spicer Theatre, Inc. v. Commissioner, 346 F.2d 704, 706 (6th Cir. 1965);
Commissioner v. Chelsea Products, 197 F.2d 620, 623 (3d Cir. 1952).
14 See Treas. Reg. 1.482-2(b)(as amended in 1988).
15 See Treas. Reg. 1.482-2(d). The proper pricing of intercompany transfers of intan-
gible property under section 482 has proved to be very difficult for both taxpayers and the
Tax Court. See Hospital Corp. of America v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 520 (1983); Eli Lilly,
& Co. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 996 (1985), rev'd in part, aff'd in part and remanded, 856 F.2d
855 (7th Cir. 1988); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 172 (1985); G.D. Searle &
Co. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 252 (1987). In 1986, Congress sought to relieve some of
the confusion that has plagued the tax community by amending section 482 by adding a
provision requiring that payments to a related entity with respect to an intangible be
"commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible." 26 U.S.C. 482 (1986).
The Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service then engaged in a study of
the history and theory of the administration of section 482 and issued "A Study of In-
tercompany Pricing." Internal Revenue Service, Treasury Department, "A Study of In-
tercompany Pricing" (Discussion Draft, Oct. 18, 1988). This report, known as the section
482 "White Paper," presented a series of recommendations to Congress that would allow
a more uniform approach to the intangible transfer problem inherent in the regulations to
section 482. For a discussion of issues surrounding the arm's length price standard for
intercompany transfers of intangible property, see Ungerman, The White Paper: The Stealth
Bomber of the Section 482 Arsenal, 42 Sw. L.J. 1107 (1989); Durando, Prices on Transfers of
Intangible Property Between Related Taxpayers: Can the Section 482 White Paper's Arm's Length Re-
turn Method Work?, 41 FLA. L. REV. 813 (1989).
16 See Treas. Reg. 1.482-2(e). See infra note 19.
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as possible, its transfer price to Sub-Italia to minimize taxable in-
come.' 7 By arbitrarily setting its transfer price, Corp-America could
shift much of its income to Sub-Italia, and thereby avoid the higher
United States income tax liability. Clearly, the Treasury's ability to
generate revenue would be impeded without the aid of section
482.18 Section 482 allows the Commissioner to reallocate income
back to Corp-America where examination reveals that the tax
records of Corp-America have been understated due to arbitrary
transfer pricing. In our example, under section 482 the district di-
rector is authorized to redetermine the taxable income that Corp-
America would have recognized if the transfer price charged to Sub-
Italia were equal to the transfer price Corp-America would have
charged to an uncontrolled foreign buyer at arm's length.' 9
III. Procter & Gamble, Co. v. Comm'r 20
The dispute in Procter & Gamble concerned the allocation of roy-
alty payments from Procter and Gamble Espana, S.A. (P&G Espana),
to its parent corporation, Procter and Gamble A.G. (AG Swiss), a
wholly owned Swiss subsidiary of Procter & Gamble, Co. (P&G). 2'
Although Spanish law prohibited a wholly owned Spanish subsidiary
from making any royalty or technical assistance payments to its for-
eign parent company, 22 the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue
Service contended that a section 482 allocation of income from P&G
Espana to AG Swiss was necessary to clearly reflect income recog-
nized by P&G.2 3 The Tax Court held that the deflection of income
from AG Swiss to P&G Espana was caused by operation of Spanish
law and not by P&G's exercise of control over AG Swiss and P&G
Espana so as to improperly shift income.2 4 Therefore, according
17 Conversely, if Sub-Italia were subject to a higher tax rate in Italy, Corp-America
would attempt to sell to Sub-Italia at an inflated price to minimize income recognized by
the subsidiary.
18 See Case Comment, Income Tax-Section 482 Of The Internal Revenue Act.- Commissioner's
Authority to Allocate Income Is Limited by Taxpayer Legal Disability-Commissioner of Internal
Revenue Service v. First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., 405 U.S. 394 (1972), 48 WASH. L.
REV. 492 (1973) (warning that "without the flexibility added to the Code by Section 482,
businesses would have considerable discretion to restructure their activities and thus alter
their true taxable income so as to defeat the purposes of the Code." Id. at 494).
19 Treas. Reg. 1.482-1(b)(1). Specifically, Treas. Reg. 1.482-2(e) provides a rather
complicated outline as to how the Treasury will determine true taxable income where one
controlled taxpayer sells tangible property to another. The regulations prescribe three
methods for determining an arm's length price: the comparable uncontrolled price
method, the resale price method, and the cost plus method. Treas. Reg. 1.482-2(e)(1)(ii).
In addition, Treas. Reg. 1.482-2(e)(1)(iii) states that "some appropriate method of pricing
other than those described" may be used where none of these methods can be applied
under the circumstances.
20 95 T.C. 323 (1990).
21 Id. at 324.
22 Id. at 326.
23 Id. at 330-31.
24 Id. at 336.
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to the court, the Commissioner's section 482 allocation was
unwarranted. 25
During the years at issue, P&G was an Ohio corporation en-
gaged in manufacturing and marketing consumer and industrial
products through domestic and foreign subsidiaries. 26 AG Swiss, a
wholly owned Swiss subsidiary of P&G, marketed P&G's products in
countries where P&G did not already have a marketing affiliate. 27 In
September 1967, P&G applied to the Presidency of the Spanish Gov-
ernment requesting permission to organize a wholly owned subsidi-
ary, P&G Espana, to manufacture consumer and industrial products
in Spain. 28 Under Spanish law, prior approval from the Spanish
Council of Ministers was required in order for foreign ownership of a
Spanish corporation to exceed fifty percent.2 9 The Spanish govern-
ment approved P&G's application for one hundred percent owner-
ship in P&G Espana, but prohibited P&G Espana from making any
royalty payments to P&G. 30 Spanish counsel advised P&G that it was
useless to protest the government's prohibition of royalty payments
by P&G Espana if P&G insisted upon one hundred percent owner-
ship.3 1 Consequently, P&G did not formally appeal the Spanish gov-
ernment's decision.3 2
25 Id. at 337.
26 Id. at 324.
27 Id. Under a License and Service Agreement, known as a "package fee agreement,"
between P&G and AG Swiss, AG Swiss paid royalties to P&G for its non-exclusive right to
use P&G's intangible property. Id. Royalties paid by AG Swiss were based upon net sales
of P&G's products by AG Swiss and its subsidiaries. Id. AG Swiss entered into similar
technical assistance and other service agreements with its wholly owned subsidiaries. Id.
28 Id. at 325. In the application letter addressed to the "Presidency of the Spanish
Government," P&G requested authorization to organize P&G Espana. The letter stated
that P&G intended to own all of the capital stock of P&G Espana either directly or through
a wholly owned subsidiary. d. According to the letter, P&G Espana would manufacture
and sell consumer and industrial products such as synthetic detergents, soaps, and toilet-
ries. Id.
29 Id. Article First of the First Title of the Spanish Law of Monetary Crimes of No-
vember 24, 1938, provided authority for regulating payments from Spanish corporations
to residents of foreign countries. Id. Paragraphs 14 through 17 required prior govern-
mental approval for payments to foreign residents. Id. Making such payments without
prior governmental authorization constituted a crime. Id. In September 1973, the Span-
ish government issued Decree 2343/1973 which provided specific regulations for technol-
ogy agreements. Id. at 327. In December of that year, the Ministry of Industry issued an
order outlining rules for technology agreements under Decree 2343. Id. at 328. Para-
graph 12 of article 3 stated that the Ministry of Industry should not give favorable treat-
ment to technology agreements between a Spanish subsidiary and a foreign parent that
provided for royalty payments to the parent for the subsidiary's use of the parent's tech-
nology where the parent's capital investment in the subsidiary exceeded fifty percent. Id.
Royalty payments were authorized, however, where foreign ownership was less than fifty
percent. Id.
30 Id. at 326.
31 Id. When P&G Espana was organized, several of its competitors likewise could not
make royalty payments abroad. Id.
32 Id. After incorporating P&G Espana through P&G Swiss, P&G Espana made sev-
eral requests to increase P&G's capital investment. Id. at 326-27. Although granting P&G
Espana's requests, the Spanish government conditioned each approval subject to the pro-
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In 1968 P&G incorporated P&G Espana through AG Swiss.
From the date of incorporation until 1985, AG Swiss paid royalties to
P&G based on a percentage of P&G Espana's net sales and reduced
its income accordingly. 33 During these years, however, P&G Espana
never made any payments to AG Swiss for the use of P&G's technol-
ogy. 34 In 1985, the Spanish government changed its system for au-
thorizing foreign investment and in 1987, the Spanish government
approved P&G Espana's application for removal of the prohibition
against the payment of royalties. 35 The Internal Revenue Service
then sought to increase AG Swiss's taxable income for the years 1978
and 1979 by allocating income from P&G Espana to AG Swiss under
section 482.36 The Commissioner determined that income in the
amounts of $1,232,653 and $1,795,005 for the years 1978 and 1979
should be allocated to AG Swiss which in turn increased P&G's sub-
part F income under section 951 (a) (1) (A).3 7
Relying upon the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner v.
First Security Bank of Utah,38 which held that the Commissioner's sec-
tion 482 allocation of insurance premium income was improper
where federal law prohibited the taxpayer from receiving such in-
come, 39 P&G contended that it did not improperly exercise its con-
trol over AG Swiss and P&G Espana to shift income it could not
legally receive under Spanish law.40 According to P&G, section 482
hibition of any royalty payments to AG Swiss or P&G. Id at 327. On May 19, 1970, coun-
sel for P&G Espana met with an official from the Spanish Ministry of Industry to discuss
the possibility that P&G Espana could make technical assistance payments to AG Swiss. Id.
However, the Spanish Government refused to grant permission for such payments. Id.
The Spanish Government discouraged these appeals due to concerns that companies situ-
ated similar to P&G Espana would abuse technical assistance payments and thereby re-
move profits from Spanish taxation. Id.
33 Id. at 330.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 330-31. The Commissioner's allocation was based on a royalty of two per-
cent of P&G Espana's net sales of P&G's products. P&G did not contest the amount of the
allocations but contended that no allocations from P&G Espana were proper under section
482. Id. at 331.
37 Id. at 330-31. Subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code was enacted by Congress to
prevent U.S. taxpayers from using foreign corporations to accumulate certain types of in-
come in low-tax jurisdictions. R. DOERNBERG, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 172 (1989) [here-
inafter DOERNBERG]; R. HELLOWELL & R. PUGH, TAXATION OF TRANSNATIONAL
TRANSACTIONS 1987-1988 at 252 (1987). Under section 951 (a)(l)(A)(i) of the Internal
Revenue Code, a U.S. shareholder of a controlled foreign corporation is treated as having
received a current distribution of his pro rata share of the controlled foreign corporation's
subpart F income. The subpart F income of a controlled foreign corporation includes
"foreign base company income." 26 U.S.C. § 952(a)(2). In turn, "foreign base company
income" is composed of several categories of income that otherwise could be isolated by a
U.S. taxpayer in the controlled foreign corporation's low-tax jurisdiction. DOERNBERG,
supra, at 176. See 26 U.S.C. § 954 (1988).
38 405 U.S. 394 (1972). See infra notes 59-85 and accompanying text.
39 First Security Bank, 405 U.S. at 404-05.
40 Procter & Gamble, 95 T.C. at 332.
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did not apply and AG Swiss' income should not be increased. 4'
The Commissioner advanced two theories supporting the posi-
tion that section 482 should apply. First, the Commissioner argued
that the prohibition of royalty payments from P&G Espana was
"merely an administrative decision" by the Spanish government.4 2
Because P&G Espana "voluntarily waived" this decision by failing to
formally appeal the prohibition of royalty payments, First Security
Bank did not apply.43 Second, the Commissioner argued that even
assuming that P&G Espana was bound by the Spanish government's
decision, the facts of First Security Bank were distinguishable.44 In
First Security Bank, federal law prohibited the related taxpayer from
receiving income from the affiliate. 45 In the present case, however,
Spanish law only prohibited the wholly owned Spanish subsidiary
from making the royalty payments to a foreign parent.4 6 Because
AG Swiss could have received royalty payments from an unrelated
Spanish company at arm's length, the transactions between P&G Es-
pana and AG Swiss effected an artificial shifting of income.4 7 There-
fore, the Commissioner argued that the tax consequences of the
relationship between P&G Espana and AG Swiss did not "clearly re-
flect" the true taxable income of AG Swiss. 48
Contrary to the Commissioner's primary contention that First Se-
curity Bank did not apply to the case at hand, the Tax Court con-
cluded that section 482 was not applicable where foreign law, and
not the members of the controlled group, acted to distort income of
a subsidiary; therefore, the sole issue before the court was whether
Spanish law indeed prohibited payment of royalties by P&G Es-
pana. 49 Finding that Spanish law only allowed royalty payments
41 Id.
42 Id. at 333. The Commissioner characterized the Spanish government's prohibition
of royalty payments as "an administrative decision, arbitrarily determined and subject to
appellate review .... Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. The court recognized that the Supreme Court in First Security Bank did not
decide whether section 482 would apply where foreign law, rather than domestic law, pro-
hibited payments between companies subject to common ownership. Id.
45 See First Security Bank, 405 U.S. at 400-02.
.46 Procter & Gamble, 95 T.C. at 333.
47 Id. The court rephrased the Commissioner's argument: "because AG [Swiss]
could have received royalty payments from an unrelated Spanish company, and would
have demanded royalties if bargaining at arm's length ... [t]he transaction, albeit a prod-
uct of Spanish law, effects an artificial shifting of income and does not clearly reflect
income."
48 Id.
49 Id. at 336.
[Slection 482 simply does not apply where restrictions imposed by law, and
not the actions of the controlling interest, serve to distort income among the
controlled group. Accordingly, in order to decide whether [the Commis-
sioner's] allocation is appropriate . . . we must determine whether Spanish
law prohibited or blocked [P&G] Espana from making royalty payments to
AG [Swiss]. Id.
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where companies comparable to AG Swiss held less than fifty percent
ownership in a Spanish subsidiary, the court concluded that the
Spanish government's prohibition of royalty payments by P&G Es-
pana was not arbitrary.50 Moreover, the court stated that P&G Es-
pana's failure to file a formal appeal with the Spanish government
did not affect its determination that a section 482 allocation was
inappropriate. 5'
The Tax Court emphasized that P&G had valid business reasons
for one hundred percent ownership of P&G Espana. 52 The court
noted that like the taxpayer in First Security Bank, P&G did not utilize
its control over P&G Espana to arbitrarily shift income nor did it
structure its capitalization of P&G Espana to avoid taxes.53 Although
P&G could have structured its ownership of P&G Espana through
less than fifty percent ownership so as to circumvent the Spanish
prohibition of royalty payments to a majority owner, P&G was not
required to capitalize P&G Espana to maximize its tax liability "as
long as the transaction in question ha[d] substance."154
The court also refused to agree with the Commissioner's at-
tempt to distinguish First Security Bank on the grounds that federal
law in First Security Bank prohibited receipt of income whereas Spanish
law only prohibited payment of income. 55 Although the Supreme
50 Id. at 337. In determining that Spanish law indeed prohibited P&G Espana from
making royalty payments, the court found compelling the express prohibition against roy-
alty payments contained in the approval letters granting permission to organize P&G Es-
pana and permitting capital increases. Id. at 336. The court also emphasized that
companies comparable to P&G Espana were likewise barred from making royalty pay-
ments to their foreign parents. Id.
51 Id. at 337. Although P&G Espana did prepare a formal application requesting that
the prohibition against royalty payments be lifted, P&G Espana abandoned its efforts after
informal communications with Spanish officials. Id. In addition, testimony revealed that
although appeal of the royalty prohibition was possible, "an appeal always puts you in a
very difficult position vis-a-vis of the public administration and you could in the future be
blackmailed by the official who has to approve afterwards all the dossiers in the exchange
control authority." Id.
52 Id. at 338. Through 100 percent ownership in P&G Espana, P&G could ensure
confidentiality of its technology, and P&G Espana would be able to obtain access to addi-
tional investment capital from P&G. Id. at 338. In addition, P&G contended that 100
percent ownership was necessary due to the risks in mass-producing P&G consumer prod-
ucts. Id. at 326.
53 d. at 338. In fact, on three occasions, P&G sought for and received authorization
from the Spanish government to receive compensation for engineering services provided
to P&G Espana notwithstanding the government's similar prohibition against such pay-
ments. d.
54 Id.
55 d. at 339.
As we see it, this is a distinction without a difference. If [P&G] Espana could
not by law make royalty payments to AG [Swiss] .. .AG [Swiss] could not
receive them. In this light [the Commissioner's] contention is illogical, a non
sequitur. To the extent that AG [Swiss] did not and could not receive pay-
ment, First Security Bank controls. Id.
The court also stated that their decision did not allow "section 482 to be abrogated" by
foreign law. d. "[W]e fail to see how the First Security Bank analysis differs whether
considering the effect of foreign law as opposed to domestic law." d.
[VOL. 16
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 482
Court did not address whether section 482 was equally applicable
whether the payment or the receipt of income was prohibited, the
Tax Court concluded that the proper focus in either event was
whether the taxpayer utilized its control to shift income. 56 Because
the shifting of income was the result of Spanish law and not P&G's
improper exercise of control over P&G Espana, the "threshold for
application of section 482" was absent. 57 The court did not address
whether a section 482 allocation would be appropriate where the
transaction between the related taxpayers lacked a legitimate busi-
ness purpose.58
IV. Commissioner v. First Security Bank of Utah and the Legal
Disability Doctrine
Any analysis of the Tax Court's decision in Procter & Gamble must
begin with an examination of Commissioner v. First Security Bank of
Utah.59 In First Security Bank, two banks, First Security Bank of Utah
and First Security Bank of Idaho ("the Banks"), and Security Life, an
insurance company, were wholly owned subsidiaries of First Security
Corp. ("the Holding Company"). 60 In 1948 the Banks began offer-
ing to arrange credit life and health insurance for borrowers. 6 1 Bor-
rowers were referred by the Banks to an independent insurance
company to underwrite the insurance. 62 The insurance company
would then reinsure the policies with Security Life.63 Security Life,
licensed to engage in the insurance business, would retain eighty five
percent of the premiums from the independent insurance compa-
nies. 64 Security life paid no sales commissions to the Banks for gen-
56 Id. at 340.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 341. "We do not have before us, and therefore do not address, whether a
section 482 allocation may be appropriate where legitimate business purposes are lack-
ing." Id.
The Commissioner also argued that the court's decision rendered Treasury Regula-
tion 1.482-1(d)(6) meaningless. Id. at 340. Treasury Regulation 1.482-1(d)(6) provides
that if payment for the rendition of services among members of a group of controlled
entities is prevented because of foreign law, the taxpayer may elect to defer any section
482 allocations of income until the income is no longer deferable, if the taxpayer also
defers expenses related to that income. The court dismissed the Commissioner's conten-
tion stating that because section 482 does not apply, neither do the underlying regula-
tions. Proctor & Gamble, 95 T.C. at 341.
59 405 U.S. 394 (1972).
60 Id. at 396.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 398.
63 Id. Before 1954, borrowers were referred to independent insurance companies
who paid sales commissions to an insurance agency, Ed. D. Smith & Sons, which was an-
other wholly owned subsidiary of Holding Company. The sales commissions were re-
ported as income by First Security Co., another wholly owned subsidiary of Holding
Company, which maintained records of purchased insurance and forwarded premiums to
the insurance companies. Id. at 396-97.
64 Id at 398.
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erating credit insurance. 65
Between the years 1955 and 1959, Security Life reported the re-
tained insurance premiums in its income. 66 Because Security Life
was subject to a lower tax rate than the Holding Company, the total
tax liability for the Holding Company and its subsidiaries was less
than it would have been had First Security paid sales commissions to
the Banks. 67 Pursuant to section 482, the Commissioner sought to
allocate forty percent of Security Life's premium income to the
Banks as compensation for processing the credit life insurance even
though no commissions were ever received by the Banks.68
In determining whether "a shifting or distorting of the Banks'
true net income result[ed]" 69 from Security Life's receipt and reten-
tion of the premiums, the Court recognized that federal law prohib-
ited the banks from acting as insurance agents and the banks
therefore were unable to receive a share of the insurance premi-
ums.70 According to the Court, an underlying concept of taxable in-
come is that a taxpayer must be free to receive and must have
"complete dominion" over the income in question.7' Based upon
Treasury Regulation 1.482-1(b)(1), 72 the Court reasoned that sec-
tion 482 only applies where the controlling interest has "complete
power" to shift income between the controlled affiliates. 73 Because
65 Id.
66 Id. at 399.
67 Id. Under the Life Insurance Company Tax Act of 1955, 70 Stat. 36 (1960), in
effect during the years 1955 to 1957, and under the Life Insurance Company Income Tax
Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-69, 73 Stat. 112 (1959), insurance companies were subject to
preferential tax treatment. First Security Bank, 405 U.S. at 399 n. 6.
68 Id. at 400.
69 Id. at 400-01.
70 Id. at 402. Under section 92 of the National Bank Act of 1916, national banks
could not act as insurance agents when located in places having a population not exceed-
ing 5000 inhabitants. Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 270, 39 Stat. 752, 753 (1916),
amended by Act of April 5, 1918, Pub. L. No. 121, 40 Stat. 506, 512 (1918)(prohibition
limiting banks to act as insurance agents omitted and never placed in United States Code).
Section 92 did not explicitly prohibit banks in cities of more than 5000 inhabitants from
acting as insurance agents but courts have held that it implicitly does. First Security Bank,
405 U.S. at 401. See, e.g., Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents, 399 F.2d 1010,
1013 (5th Cir. 1968); Commissioner v. Morris Trust, 367 F.2d 794, 795 (4th Cir. 1966).
Because the Banks in First Security Bank operated in a city with a population exceeding 5000
persons, the Court held that section 92 of the National Bank Act prohibited the Banks
from acting as insurance agents by soliciting or collecting insurance premiums. 405 U.S.
at 407. Section 92 was omitted from the National Banking Act of 1918 but was still consid-
ered to be in effect during the years of the transactions between the Banks and Security
Life. Id. at 401 n. 12.
71 First Security Bank, 405 U.S. at 403. "We know of no decision of this Court wherein
a person has been found to have taxable income that he did not receive and that he was
prohibited from receiving." Id.
72 "The interests controlling a group of controlled taxpayers are assumed to have
complete power to cause each controlled taxpayer so to conduct its affairs that its transac-
tions and accounting records truly reflect the taxable income from the property and busi-
ness of each of the controlled taxpayers." Treas. Reg. 1.482-1 (b)(l).
73 First Security Bank, 405 U.S. at 404.
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 482
the Holding Company would have violated federal law if it had exer-
cised control over its subsidiaries to cause the Banks' receipt of in-
surance premiums, the Banks' legal disability to receive the premium
income negated the Commissioner's authority to reallocate income
under section 482.74
The Court finally noted that a similar prohibition on the receipt
of insurance premium income would exist even if the Holding Com-
pany had dealt at arm's length with an independent, uncontrolled
bank. 75 Because federal law applied equally to all banks, the purpose
of section 482 in placing controlled and uncontrolled taxpayers on a
tax parity was satisfied by the Court's determination that a section
482 allocation was inappropriate. 76
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun argued that the ma-
jority erroneously concluded that illegality to receive income impli-
cates inability to tax that income. 77 Instead, Blackmun argued the
purpose of section 482 is to correct a distortion of income and effec-
tuate a proper reflection of true income. 78 The specific wording of
section 482 states that the statute is directed both to "prevent eva-
sion of taxes" and to "clearly reflect income."' 79 Blackmun felt that
the Court's emphasis on the Banks' legal inability to receive insur-
ance premium income placed "undue emphasis [on] the first alterna-
tive of [section] 482, and seem[ed] almost wholly to ignore the
second."80  Blackmun conceded that because section 482 is
74 Id. at 405. "The 'complete power' referred to in the regulations hardly includes
the power to force a subsidiary to violate the law." Id. The basis of the Supreme Court's
decision is known as the "taxpayer disability" doctrine. In relying upon the "complete
dominion" principle of section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code to formulate his disability
argument, Mr. Justice Powell appears to have added a "complete power" condition to
application of section 482. The Expanded Scope of Section 482, supra note 4, at 858. Under
this interpretation of First Security Bank, the Commissioner's power to allocate income
under section 482 is now limited to his power to tax income under section 70. See id.
75 405 U.S. at 407.
76 Id. The Supreme Court's decision in First Security Bank was met with mixed re-
views. Some commentators criticized the decision for "its exhaltation of form over sub-
stance." Note, Income Tax-Section 482 of The Internal Revenue Act: Commissioner's Authority To
Allocate Income Is Limited By Taxpayer Legal Disability, 48 WASH. L. REV. 492, 502 (1973).
Other commentators were less critical of First Security Bank. See Teschner, First Security Bank
of Utah: Taxpayer Disability and the Supreme Court, 50 TAXES 260 (1972).
Mr. Justice Powell's first opinion for the Court has infused tax law with a
basic humanism-has, in short, treated taxpayers compassionately and as peo-
ple. For the first time the Court has spoken directly and conclusively: yes,
taxpayer volition is significant and, no, taxpayer disability may not be over-
looked by the tax collector.
Id. at 260 (emphasis in original).
77 First Security Bank, 405 U.S. at 418 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun
stated that the language used by the Court to support its "complete dominion" theory is
"language used to support the taxation of income, it is not language, as the Court would
make it out to be, that supported the nontaxation of income." Id. at 424 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)(emphasis in original).
78 See id. at 419.
79 Id. at 419.
80 Id.
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"designed to produce for tax purposes ... economic realities and to
have the tax consequences follow those realities and not some struc-
tured nonreality," the Court should have focused on the controlling
force generating the premium income. 8'
According to Justice Blackmun, the majority failed to properly
recognize that it was the Banks, and not Security Life, that generated
the premium income on behalf of Security Life.82 Had the Banks
and Security Life dealt with each other at arm's length, the Banks
would have been compensated for their services.83 Clearly, the ben-
efits of the transactions between the Banks and Security Life inured
to the Holding Company regardless of "the particular pocket into
which that [referral] income might initially be routed. '8 4 According
to Blackmun, by ignoring the economic reality of the control exerted
by Holding Company, the majority's holding "dull[ed] one edge of
what ha[d] been a sharp two-edged tool fashioned and bestowed by
the Congress upon the Internal Revenue Service for the effective en-
forcement of our federal tax laws." 85
The Court's decision that section 482 did not apply to the facts
of First Security Bank represented a retreat from the earlier position
taken by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals under almost identical
facts in Local Finance Corp. v. Commissioner.8 6 Stating that Local Finance
Corp. was "erroneously decided,"87 the Court instead sided with the
Tax Court in L.E. Skunk Latex Products, Inc. v. Commissioner.8" In
Shunk, the Tax Court rejected the Commissioner's allocation of in-
come to the taxpayer for underselling products to a controlled part-
nership on the grounds that prices charged by the taxpayer were
81 Id.
82 Id. at 421-22.
83 Id. at 422.
84 Id. at 420. Justice Blackmun stated that "the earnings themselves stayed within the
corporate structure dominated by Holding Company, and did not pass elsewhere with
consequent tax impact elsewhere." Id. at 422.
85 Id. at 426. Justice Blackmun's reference to section 482 as a "two edged tool" de-
notes the Commissioner's discretion to use section 482 to prevent the evasion of taxes or
to achieve the proper reflection of income. Comment, First Security Bank of Utah-Its Effect
Upon The Expanded Scope of Section 482, 61 Ky. L.J. 845, 845 (1973).
86 407 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 405 U.S. 394 (1971). In Local Finance Corp.,
Local Finance organized two corporations to serve as insurance brokers to provide fire and
casualty insurance on property given as security to Local Finance by its borrowers. 407
F.2d at 630. Although state law prohibited Local Finance and its wholly owned finance
companies from receiving any insurance premiums, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the Tax Court's determination that fifty percent of the insurance premiums were
allocable to its subsidiaries under section 482 despite non-receipt. Id. at 633. According
to the court, the issue of taxation without receipt was subordinate to the question of
whether the subsidiaries would have entered into the same agreement had they bargained
at arm's length. Id. at 632. The fact that the finance companies did not actually receive
insurance proceeds did not prevent taxation. Id. at 633. Instead, the Commissioner's allo-
cation properly compensated the finance companies for generating the insurance premi-
ums. Id. at 632.
87 Commissioner v. Local Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 394, 406 n. 22 (1971).
88 18 T.C. 940 (1952).
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fixed by regulations of the Office of Price Administration and legally
could not have been raised. 89
In 1980, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals applied First Security
Bank to a case heavily relied upon by the Tax Court in Procter & Gam-
ble. In Salyersville National Bank v. United States 9 0 the court held that a
section 482 allocation of income from sales commissions to the Saly-
ersville National Bank was unwarranted where the bank's president,
a licensed life insurance agent, received sales commissions on
purchases of credit life insurance by the bank's borrowers. 9 1 The
Commissioner contended that, during the tax years 1969, 1970, and
1971, insurance commissions paid to the bank's president should
have been reported as income to the bank and as dividend distribu-
tions to the president. 92 The bank argued, however, that because
state law precluded receipt, the bank never could have legally re-
ceived any insurance sales commissions. 93
Although the court did not determine whether the bank was
prohibited under state law from becoming licensed insurance agents
and thereby legally able to receive insurance sales commissions,94
the court concluded that the banks never took the necessary steps to
become a licensed insurance agent and therefore were never legally
entitled to receive the income in question.95 The court interpreted
the Commissioner's power to reallocate income as being dependant
89 Id. at 961. In Shunk, the court stated " [w]e would therefore regard this diversion of
income as an appropriate occasion [for a section 482 allocation] were it not for certain
wartime regulations issued by the Office of Price Administration." Id. at 959. Therefore,
"the Commissioner had no authority to attribute to petitioners income which they could
not have received." Id. at 961.
In Local Finance Corp., the court distinguished Shunk on the grounds that in Shunk, the
taxpayer could not have raised its prices whether dealing with a controlled or independent
distributor. 407 F.2d at 634. Therefore, in Shunk, no allocations were necessary to place a
controlled corporation on a tax parity with an uncontrolled taxpayer. Id.
90 613 F.2d 650 (6th Cir. 1980).
91 Id. at 656. Although the taxpayer bank did not require credit life insurance on
every loan, where the borrowers did purchase insurance, the bank would refer the borrow-
ers to the bank's president, a licensed insurance agent, or to other agents. Id. at 650-51. If
insurance was purchased, the bank would add the premiums to the loan amount and then
credit the insurance agent's account. Id. at 651. At other times, borrowers would write
checks directly to the bank's president. Id.
92 Id. at 650-51.
93 Id. at 651. After paying a deficiency assessment, the taxpayer filed a claim for a
refund with the Internal Revenue Service and then filed suit in the Federal District Court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky. Id. The district court granted summary judgment on
behalf of the Internal Revenue Service on the ground that state law did not bar the bank
from becoming an insurance agent. Id. Therefore, a section 482 allocation of income
properly reflected the bank's income. Id.
94 Id. at 654. The parties disagreed as to whether the corporate bank could become a
licensed insurance agent under Kentucky law during the tax year 1969. Id. at 653. How-
ever, when the Kentucky insurance code was amended in 1970, corporations apparently
became eligible for licensure. Id. at 654.
95 Id. at 655. Although the bank arguably could have been licensed during the tax
years 1970 and 1971, the bank never met the prerequisites for becoming a licensed insur-
ance agent such as the amendment of its articles of incorporation. Id. at 654-55. There-
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upon whether the taxpayer structured its transactions with no legiti-
mate business purpose.96 In the instant case, the taxpayer satisfied
the legitimate purpose test: all sales commissions were received and
taxed to the president because the bank itself could not lawfully act
as an insurance agent and receive sales commissions.97 In the
court's view, the Commissioner's primary contention was that the
bank had a duty to qualify as an insurance agent so that it could law-
fully receive the sales commissions.9" The court, however, held that
under First Security Bank,99 even though the bank may have been able
to qualify as an insurance agent, it was not required to exercise that
power so that it could be taxed on the insurance commissions. 100
Because the bank's receipt of insurance premiums would have vio-
lated state law, a section 482 reallocation was inappropriate.'10
V. A Critical Analysis of Procter & Gamble and the Applicability of
the Legal Disability Doctrine to Section 482
The Tax Court's decision in Procter & Gamble is significant be-
cause of its expansion of the First Security Bank holding into the taxa-
tion of international business transactions. Under Procter & Gamble,
the scope of section 482 is further limited by the taxpayer's inability
to receive income under foreign as well as domestic law. After First
Security Bank was decided, the Internal Revenue Service sought to
limit the First Security Bank analysis to situations where domestic law,
rather than foreign law, blocked receipt of income. In several subse-
quent Service rulings, the Internal Revenue Service maintained that
income was allocable under section 482 notwithstanding contrary
foreign law: under First Security Bank only laws of the United States
could block a section 482 allocation of income.
For example, in Technical Advice Memorandum 7923003, a for-
eign subsidiary and its domestic parent entered into technical assist-
ance agreements providing for the payment of fees equal to five
fore, the court recognized that the bank could not have legally received the sales
commissions. Id. at 655.
96 Id. at 653.
97 Id. at 653. The court found several legitimate purposes served by the structure of
the transactions. Referring borrowers to the president: (1) allowed the borrowers to ob-
tain credit life insurance conveniently; (2) allowed the bank to provide a service to cus-
tomers indirectly that it could not legally offer directly; and (3) relieved the bank of the
burden of having to qualify as an insurance agent under Kentucky law. Id. at 652.
98 Id. at 655.
99 405 U.S. 394 (1972).
I00 Sayltersville Natl Bank, 613 F.2d at 655. The "Commissioner appears to take the
position that the taxpayer bank had a duty to qualify as an insurance agent so that it could
have legally received the income the Commissioner attempts to allocate to it. It points to
no authority for that proposition. Rather courts have stated that a taxpayer need not
structure the business to maximize taxes." Id. (citing W. Braun Co. v. CIR, 396 F.2d 264,
267 (2d Cir. 1968)).
101 Id. at 656.
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percent of the subsidiary's annual sales in exchange for scientific and
technical information concerning the manufacturing and processing
of the parent's products.10 2 The foreign government, whose author-
ity to limit payments was equally applicable to agreements between
unrelated entities, only approved fee payments of two and four per-
cent.103 Although the-parent included in its income the fees actually
paid by the subsidiary as limited by foreign law, the Service ruled
that section 482 allocations could exceed those fees actually paid. 0 4
The Service asserted that the Commissioner's authority to allocate
income under section 482 was limited by First Security Bank only
"where the taxpayer is prevented from receiving income under
United States law."' 0 5
Under almost identical facts in Revenue Ruling 82-45, the Ser-
vice held that First Security Bank does not prevent a section 482 alloca-
tion of income under a technical assistance contract where the fees
allowed by the foreign country are less than those provided for in the
contract between the foreign subsidiary and the domestic parent.10 6
Similarly, in Technical Advice Memorandum 8001017, the Service
ruled that royalties could be allocated under section 482 to a domes-
tic parent from a foreign subsidiary even though the foreign country
prohibited the foreign subsidiary from making royalty payments to
the parent.' 0 7
The Tax Court in Procter & Gamble correctly refused to recognize
the distinction drawn by the Service in its earlier rulings that First
Security Bank is limited to those situations where domestic law rather
than foreign law blocked receipt of income. The position taken by
the Service was based on an erroneous interpretation of First Security
Bank.108 In First Security Bank the court made no suggestion that its
decision was limited to instances where domestic law blocked receipt
of income.' 0 9 Since the parent in Procter & Gamble was under a legal
disability, First Security Bank applied to foreclose a section 482 alloca-
tion regardless of whether the source of the disability was foreign or
domestic law.
In recognizing that foreign law as well as domestic law may pre-
clude a section 482 allocation, the Procter & Gamble decision is consis-
tent with the underlying purposes of tax treaties between the United
102 Tech. Adv. Mem. 7923003 (Feb. 22, 1979).
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. To determine the proper amount of the allocations to be made, the Service
stated that the arm's length standard must be applied. Id.
106 Rev. Rul. 82-45, 1982-1 C.B. 89.
107 Tech. Adv. Mem. 8001017 (Sept. 20, 1979).
108 Aland, Can IRS Use Section 482 to Allocate Income Which Cannot Be Earned Under Appli.
cable Law?, 52 J..TAx'N 220, 221 (1980).
109 Id.
1991] 685.
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
States and other countries. o10 One purpose of income tax treaties
between the United States and foreign countries is the prevention of
double taxation of income recognized by companies subject both to
United States and foreign income tax."1' If foreign subsidiaries and
domestic parents are subject to taxation on the same income through
a section 482 allocation to the parent, the treaties' purposes of pre-
vention of double taxation will be thwarted." 2
Another significant aspect of the Procter & Gamble decision con-
cerns the court's discussion of whether under section 482 taxpayers
have a duty to ameliorate the shifting consequences caused by appli-
cation of foreign or domestic law when the taxpayer could structure
its business transactions so that tax consequences would follow eco-
nomic realities. As noted by the court, taxpayers are not required to
structure business transactions so as to maximize their tax liability as
long as legitimate business purposes are served. 1 3 Like the tax-
payer in First Security Bank, P&G was able to accomplish several legiti-
mate business purposes by organizing P&G Espana as a wholly
owned subsidiary of AG Swiss. Through complete ownership of
P&G Espana, P&G ensured that P&G Espana would have ready ac-
cess to additional capital financing. 1 4 In addition, full ownership of
P&G Espana through AG Swiss served to protect the confidentiality
110 The United States has tax treaties with many other countries. See, e.g., Canada Con-
vention and Protocol for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Mar. 4, 1942, United States -
Canada, 56 Stat. 1399, T.S. No. 983; Convention Between the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the United States of America on Matters of Taxation,June 20, 1973, United
States - U.S.S.R., 27 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 8225; Convention With Respect to Taxes on
Income, Dec. 4, 1973, United States - Romania, 27 U.S.T. 165, T.I.A.S. No. 8228; Conven-
tion for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Re-
spect to Taxes on Income, Oct. 8, 1974, United States - Poland, 28 U.S.T. 891, T.I.A.S.
No. 8486; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income, Feb. 12, 1979, United States - Hungary, 30
U.S.T. 6357, T.I.A.S. No. 9560.
111 R. HELLAWELL & R. PUGH, TAXATION OF TRANSNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 1987-1988
at 201 (1987). Kelly, A Comparative Analysis of the United States - People's Republic of China Tax
Treaty: United States Tax Treaty Policy Concerning Developing Countries, 13 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L.
& CoM. 83, 84 (1986). But see Owens, United States Income Tax Treaties: Their Role in Relieving
Double Taxation, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 428, 430 (1963)(stating that U.S. income tax treaties
play a "very marginal role in relieving double taxation").
112 See Aland, supra note 108, at 222. (stating that the type of section 482 allocation as
proposed in Technical Advice Memorandums 7923003 and 8001017, supra notes 102-07
and accompanying text, "presents the type of double taxation situation" that tax treaties
are "designed to prevent").
During the years 1978 and 1979, no tax treaty existed between the United States and
Spain. Procter & Gamble, 95 T.C. at 333 n.3.
113 Procter & Gamble, 95 T.C. at 338 (citing Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935)).
As Judge Learned Hand stated in Commissioner v. Newman:
[Tihere is nothing sinister in so arranging one's affairs as to keep taxes as low
as possible. Everybody does so, rich or poor, and all do right, for nobody
owes any public duty to pay more than the law demands: taxes are enforced
exactions, not voluntary contributions. To demand more in the name of
morals is mere cant.
159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 859 (1947).
114 Procter & Gamble, 95 T.C. at 338.
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of P&G's technological rights and allowed P&G to shoulder the risks
associated with producing consumer products in a competitive in-
dustry.115 Therefore, the Procter & Gamble court emphasized that
P&G was not attempting to avoid taxation by capitalizing P&G Es-
pana through one hundred percent ownership in AG Swiss. Hence,
P&G was not required to organize P&G Espana through less than
fifty percent ownership so that royalties could be paid to AG
Swiss. 116
A disturbing aspect of the Procter & Gamble decision is the court's
refusal to address whether the Tax Court would have reached a dif-
ferent conclusion if legitimate business purposes had not been
served by AG Swiss's dominant control over P&G Espana.'" 7 Argua-
bly the court could have found that legitimate business purposes
were lacking if P&G had organized P&G Espana through AG Swiss to
take advantage of the Spanish government's prohibition against the
payment of royalties to AG Swiss. 1 8 If the Tax Court had been
faced with a taxpayer who structured its transactions to take advan-
tage of a legal prohibition against the receipt of income, the Tax
Court may have concluded that control, and not foreign law, was the
driving force behind the shifting of income. Had the Procter & Gamble
court recognized the potential for this form of tax evasion, the
court's analysis of the legitimate business purpose requirement
would be more complete.
Although the Procter & Gamble court was consistent with First Se-
curity Bank in focusing upon the fact that P&G did not exercise con-
trol over P&G Espana to shift income, examination of section 482
indicates that the Commissioner's ability to reallocate income under
section 482 may not be limited to those situations where the parent
has exercised its control over the subsidiary in order to shift income
and thereby evade United States taxation." 19 Section 482 states that
the Commissioner may reallocate income as is necessary to "prevent
evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income" of related busi-
115 Id. at 326.
116 Id. at 338 n.6.
117 "[S]ection 482 does not apply where the taxpayer's legitimate business purposes subject
it to legal restraints effectively blocking receipt of income. We do not have before us, and
therefore do not address, whether a section 482 allocation may be appropriate where legiti-
mate business purposes are lacking." Id. at 341 (emphasis added). In past cases, the Commis-
sioner has not been allowed to apply section 482 where legitimate business purposes were
present. The Expanded Scope of Section 482, supra note 4, at 849; W Braun Co. v. Commissioner,
396 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1968); Vt. Monette &Co. v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 15 (1965), aff'd, 374
F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1967).
118 "On this record, as was the case in First Security Bank, there is no evidence what-
soever that [P&G] utilized its control over its subsidiaries to manipulate or shift income
amongst them .... Because the deflection of income in this case arose as a direct conse-
quence of [P&G]'s valid business purposes and good faith compliance with Spanish law, an
allocation under section 482 is inappropriate." Proctor & Gamble, 95 T.C. at 338.
119 Initially, courts only applied section 482 to prevent tax evasion. The Expanded Scope
of Section 482, supra note 4, at 848.
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nesses. ' 20 The clear wording of section 482 indicates that two alter-
native grounds exist for a section 482 reallocation: the prevention of
tax evasion and the proper reflection of true taxable income. There
is no indication in the statute or regulations that the absence of one
objective of section 482 precludes the Commissioner from allocating
income under section 482 to achieve the other.
In First Security Bank, Justice Powell argued that under section
482 regulations no allocation may be made unless the deflection of
income is caused by the exercise of dominant control rather than the
application of foreign law.121 Treasury Regulation 1.482-1(b)(1)
states that "the taxpayers are assumed to have complete power to
cause each controlled taxpayer so to conduct its affairs that its trans-
actions and accounting records truly reflect the taxable income from
the ... business of each of the controlled taxpayers."' 22 According
to Powell, this assumption of "complete power" is not valid where
foreign law rather than the exercise of dominant control causes the
deflection of income.' 23
Upon further inspection of the regulations, however, one must
question the validity of Justice Powell's assertion that complete
power to deflect income is a prerequisite to a section 482 allocation.
In determining the true taxable income of a controlled taxpayer,
subsection (c) of Regulation 1.482-1 provides:
[T]he district director is not restricted to the case of improper ac-
counting, to the case of a fraudulent, colorable, or sham transaction,
or to the case of a device designed to ...avoid tax by shifting or.
distorting income .... The authority to determine true taxable in-
come extends to any case in which either by inadvertence or design the
taxable income ... of a controlled taxpayer, is other than it would
have been had the taxpayer ... been an uncontrolled taxpayer deal-
ing at arm's length with another uncontrolled taxpayer.' 2 4
Arguably, by implication, the issue of "complete power" to shift in-
come is irrelevant when foreign or domestic law acts to distort in-
come irrespective of whether the taxpayer improperly utilized
control to alter the tax consequences of transactions between the af-
filiated entities.' 25 Under this interpretation of section 482, the
source of the taxpayer's inability to receive income is irrelevant re-
120 26 U.S.C. § 482 (1986).
121 First Security Bank, 405 U.S. at 404-05.
122 Treas. Reg. 1.482-1(b)(1)(1988). Justice Powell relied upon this regulation in
stating that a section 482 allocation. must be premised upon the taxpayer's "complete
power" to shift income to the subsidiary. First Security Bank, 405 U.S. at 404.
123 First Security Bank, 405 U.S. at 404-05.
124 Treas. Reg. 1.482-1(c)(1988) (emphasis added).
125 Treas. Reg. 1.482-1 (c)(1988) seems to allow the Commissioner to allocate income
even where business purposes are served by the corporate organization and the taxpayer is
not attempting to minimize taxes. Mansfield, The 482 Proposed Regs: The Problems with Which
Practitioners Will Have to Contend, 28 J. TAx'N 66, 68 (1968).
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gardless of whether the disability is the result of the application of
foreign law or even intentional tax evasion.
The view that section 482 authorizes income allocation irrespec-
tive of taxpayer control finds further support in that the stated pur-
pose of section 482 which is "to place a controlled taxpayer on a tax
parity with an uncontrolled taxpayer."' 26 Such tax parity is achieved
where domestic or foreign law. blocks the -receipt of income from
either controlled or unrelated enterprises. In First Security Bank this
was precisely the situation faced by the court: federal law prohibited
the Banks from receiving referral commissions regardless of whether
the source of the payments was an unrelated entity or a member of a
controlled group. 127 In this regard, a distinction can be drawn be-
tween the application of the legal restrictions on the taxpayers in
First Security Bank and Procter & Gamble.
Unlike the legal restriction imposed upon the taxpayers in First
Security Bank, the Spanish government's prohibition against royalty
payments was based solely upon capital ownership. P&G Espana was
completely free to make royalty payments to any other unrelated for-
eign entity. The Procter & Gamble court, however, failed to recognize
this crucial distinction. In a statement on the scope and purpose of
section 482, Treasury Regulation 1.482-1(b) provides that in deter-
mining the true taxable income of the taxpayer, "[t]he standard to be
applied in every case is that of an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at
arm's length with another uncontrolled taxpayer."' 28 If AG Swiss
had transacted at arm's length with an unrelated Spanish company, it
would have required royalty payments for the use of P&G's technol-
ogy. Had the Procter & Gamble court recognized that in First Security
Bank the legal restriction imposed upon the banks applied even
where referral commissions were received from unrelated parties,
the Procter & Gamble court conceivably could have distinguished First
Security Bank and given effect to the arm's length standard prescribed
by the regulations.
Applying the arm's length standard of Treasury Regulation
1.482-1(b) to the facts of First Security Bank, the Supreme Court
would have come to the same conclusion that section 482 did not
mandate adjustment based on the fact that the banks would not have
been able to receive income from referrals .even where the banks
dealt at arm's length with an unrelated insurance company. In the
body of the Court's opinion, Justice Powell in fact recognized that
the banks would not have been able to receive referral income from
an unrelated enterprise. 129 In this regard the Supreme Court could
126 Treas. Reg. 1.482-1(b)(1)(1988).
127 First Security Bank, 405 U.S. at 405-07. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying
text.
128 Treas. Reg. 1.482-1(b)(1988).
129 First Security Bank, 405 U.S. at 407.
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have ignored the issue of whether complete power to shift income is
indeed a prerequisite to a section 482 allocation.
It is not clear whether the court in First Security Bank intended to
limit the scope of its holding to those situations where legal restric-
tions operate to block receipt of income from both affiliated and un-
related enterprises. In any event, the Procter & Gamble court seized
upon the Court's final determination in First Security Bank that section
482 should not apply unless the controlling member has used its
''complete power to shift income" to cause the deflection of income.
Since the Tax Court was bound to follow the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the scope of section 482, the Procter & Gamble analysis is
consistent with First Security Bank.
VI. Conclusion
In his dissent in First Security Bank, Justice Blackmun took solace
in his belief that the majority's interpretation of section 482 would
"only affect a few taxpayers."' 30 Instead, the First Security Bank deci-
sion served as a springboard for the Procter & Gamble court's applica-
tion of taxpayer disability and volition principles into the area of
international taxation.' 3 ' As a result, Procter & Gamble represents a
severe impediment to the Treasury's ability to reach income where
foreign law operates to block the flow of taxable income back into
the United States. For domestic business enterprises with foreign
affiliates, the Tax Court's decision represents a significant opportu-
nity to circumvent section 482 where the taxpayer alleges non-tax
related reasons for capital investment in those countries that impose
legal restrictions upon outbound expenditures. Whether the legiti-
mate business purposes requirement will be sufficient to prevent
some of these international corporations from avoiding U.S. taxation
is unclear. It is clear, however, that future Tax Court decisions will
be rendered under the guidance of a weakened section 482.
KEITH WOOD
130 Id. at 426 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
131 See Teschner, supra note 76, at 267 (characterizing the First Security Bank decision as
a "taxpayer bill of rights with respect to overriding principles of taxpayer disability and
taxpayer volition").
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